Initially, Myanmar’s democratic transition elicited much watching and waiting. Few were convinced the country was truly committed to reform since its military leaders had seemed impervious to outside pressure for decades. From the outside, what had changed their thinking wasn’t clear. One early analysis suggests perhaps economic opening only served to entrench military-linked elites’ interests. Political liberalization would also proceed just enough to give the impression of a democratizing polity, without forcing the military to give up real power.

In any case, once the 2012 by-election yielded a parliament seat for Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s pivot toward democracy seemed to be on firmer ground. Sanctions were lifted. Foreign investment rushed in. Convinced their strategy had finally borne fruit, ASEAN governments congratulated each other for persisting in their softer approach toward Myanmar’s generals. As evidence, however, when the systematic persecution of the Rohingya came to light starting in 2015, threats of western sanctions against Myanmar returned. The rejoinder turned personal, too: now State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi lost her western accolades one by one.

Yet, by following their instinct to retaliate on behalf of the Rohingya, western governments risk missing the forest for the trees and endangering Myanmar’s democratic transition in the process. After decades languishing under the generals, Myanmar faces problems the complexity and intricacy of which outsiders only begin to understand. Democracy is no cure-all for Myanmar; the Rohingya issue is merely one failure, of many, manifest in Myanmar’s society. Written by the Asia Foundation’s country representative Kim Ninh, our first Spotlight article this week focuses on precisely the challenges of democratizing Myanmar.

Our second Spotlight article this week looks at how Myanmar’s neighboring rising powers, India and China, have responded to developments in the country. First published in the Asia Times, the article  underlines the different perspectives in New Delhi and Beijing that came about from the two country’s historical ties with Myanmar. Democratization in Myanmar presents a host of issues for both capitals. New Delhi is careful not to repeat its overzealous reaction to Myanmar’s crackdown of democracy activists in 1990. For Beijing, democratization in Myanmar put it on the back foot after years of privileged access to the country’s junta.

The future of Myanmar’s democracy remains unclear, even ten years after the 2008 constitutional referendum that set off the democratic opening. As Myanmar society opens further, its warped complexes and ugly problems may get further exposure but that is no reason to retreat from engagement. Just as Aung San Suu Kyi has transformed from a sainted icon of democracy to a hard-headed politician who responds to her society’s prejudices, so, too, should illusions about Myanmar dissolve. That is perhaps for the best since Myanmar is on its tentative way to becoming a normal country with corresponding problems, great and small.