Doklam Standoff Ends: What it Means for India, China relations

Posted by AsiaViews | Sep 7, 2017 | 0 |

Hindustan Times

Aug 28, 2017

India and China should not see Doklam in terms of point-scoring but rather as a warning of the need for extending their border management framework across other borders as well

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The Doklam border crisis has ended as suddenly as it began. India announced both countries had agreed to mutually disengage their troops from the plateau along the Sino-Bhutan border. Beijing, in keeping with its recent tendency to speak in nationalistic hyperbole, said Indian troops were “retreating” and that it would continue to patrol the area. The two statements are not contradictory. China does not speak of what its troops will do. Patrolling upto a country’s claims area is allowed under the various Sino-Indian border management agreements and will now de facto be applied to the Sino-Bhutanese border as well. In effect, both governments seem to have agreed to go back to a status quo that existed before crisis began.

China’s original sin was the decision to extend a road up to the Doklam plateau in violation of the 2012 trilateral agreement on the border. The proof of the pudding, however, will be in the eating. In other words, whether Beijing will seek to change the Doklam status quo in a substantial way over the coming months remains to be seen. One will expect aggressive patrolling in the immediate future by both sides. There may even be verbal brickbats from Beijing, in keeping with the unusually harsh language that has come from the Chinese foreign ministry and media over the past few months. Sound and fury signify nothing. Keeping its troops and workers indoors is what will be the real measure of China’s intentions.

Doklam deserves some introspection on the part of India. Beijing seems to have assumed a passive Indian response to its initial construction efforts. Possibly New Delhi’s failure to respond to the initial Chinese action of demolishing two vacant Indian bunkers was misread. Or Beijing concluded that India would feel constrained about interceding on behalf of the territorial claims of a third country. Either way, there was a miscalculation that was potentially dangerous. The announcement of a withdrawal indicates neither side is interested in a wider conflict. But there needs to be some thought about the growing regional footprints of both countries and that their spheres of influence will brush against each other in third countries with increasing frequency. India and China should not see Doklam in terms of point-scoring but rather as a warning of the need for extending their border management framework across other borders as well.

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EXTRICATING NDONESIAN CHILDREN FROM ISIS INFLUENCE ABROAD

Indonesia urgently needs to revisit the possibility of repatriating the neediest of its young citizens stranded abroad, whose families had earlier joined ISIS. Most of these children are in camps in northern Syria but there are also small numbers in the Philippines, Afghanistan and Iraq. “Extricating Indonesian Children from ISIS Influence Abroad”, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) argues that the government could begin by bringing back small groups of unaccompanied children under ten years of age, who pose minimal security risk and are most vulnerable to deteriorating conditions in the camps.“The problem is that health and security conditions are worsening by the day in the Syrian camps, and the children are growing older,” says Dyah Kartika, IPAC analyst. “They need access to schools, a nurturing environment, and medical attention. If the government waits too long, the children will be further exposed to ISIS ideology.” The new report examines a 2019 list of Indonesians in camps and prisons run by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Indonesian government has been trying to verify their citizenship, but with pseudonyms, misspellings and bad transliterations, it is a daunting task. At the time the data was collected, between March and June 2019, there were 555 Indonesians in SDF camps and prisons, including 367 children. Among the children, approximately 277 were under the age of ten and 34 were unaccompanied. In June 2021, there are fewer than ten children who are both unaccompanied and under the age of ten that could be prioritized for return. Bringing back children of ISIS families is no easy task. The report analyses the main challenges faced by the Indonesian government. These include definitional issues, bureaucratic competition, the difficulty of verifying nationality, evaluating the toll of exposure to conflict, assessing security risk, and finding relatives or others willing to provide care once the children are returned. In addition, COVID has meant stringent restrictions on travel, placing further obstacles in the way of repatriation. There are several models for rehabilitation of children exposed to violent extremism in Indonesia that could be modified to accommodate the needs of children repatriated from abroad. The report examines these models and argues that the government does not need to have every detail of rehabilitation programs in place before it starts extricating children from ISIS influence. It can start by bringing back the most vulnerable children and then modify programs as needed.

“It’s important that the government see these children as victims” says Dyah. “They deserve a chance to be children again.”

Doklam Standoff Ends: What it Means for India, China relations