How ASEAN Falls into China’s Playbook on the South China Sea

Posted by AsiaViews | Nov 1, 2017 | 0 |

China President Xi Jinping will join ASEAN leaders next week for the annual East Asia Summit in Manila, where they are expected to endorse the so-called framework of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, a multilateral platform to solve territorial disputes between claimants. After 15 years in the making, the endorsement will serve as a watershed moment for all parties involved, but the question remains: how effective will it be in stopping Chinese incursions?

While China’s decision to endorse the largely ASEAN-led proposal should be seen as a positive move in the right direction, members of the regional grouping should not give a waiver to China’s coercive actions in the past, which include the expansion of its coast guard and its military presence. What may seem like a calm period now could likely be a carefully crafted scenario. History shows that China tends to swing back and forth between playing offensive against its neighbors and softening its stance only when territorial gains have been secured.

Quoting a Southeast Asian official in his piece for the Diplomat, Prashanth Prameswaran aptly compared China’s behavior to an abusive husband with repeated “cycles of hits and makeups”. For instance, China agreed to draft the framework of the Code of Conduct in 2002 only after ASEAN countries, backed by Washington, launched a formidable diplomatic campaign against its acquisition of the Mischief Reef, which began in 1995 with land reclamation.

Similarly, China’s decision in August agreeing to a final draft of the framework followed its defeat at the international tribunal in the Hague, which ruled last year in favor of the Philippines. The tribunal found that China’s claims of historic rights within the so-called nine-dash line were illegal. it also concluded that Beijing’s activities within the Philippines’ two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, such as illegal fishing and environmentally ruinous artificial island construction, infringed on Manila’s sovereign rights.

Here lies the crux of the matter: provisions within the final draft of the Code of Conduct provide little assurance that all parties would avoid making unilateral moves in the future. The fact that they are non-binding, is no guarantee that claimants will not delay, potentially indefinitely, the implementation of agreed commitments. Those who are familiar with the drafting process understands that the final draft is disappointing, to say the least.

Given this reality, it is highly regrettable that US President Donald Trump has decided to skip the coming Summit. However dreadful Trump may be as a person, the absence of US leadership means the absence of a balancing super power that essentially favors ASEAN’s interests. At a time when the US is increasingly more focused on domestic issues, it is only natural that ASEAN should become more assertive and more united in avoiding a repeat of China’s playbook on the South China Sea.

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EXTRICATING NDONESIAN CHILDREN FROM ISIS INFLUENCE ABROAD

Indonesia urgently needs to revisit the possibility of repatriating the neediest of its young citizens stranded abroad, whose families had earlier joined ISIS. Most of these children are in camps in northern Syria but there are also small numbers in the Philippines, Afghanistan and Iraq. “Extricating Indonesian Children from ISIS Influence Abroad”, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) argues that the government could begin by bringing back small groups of unaccompanied children under ten years of age, who pose minimal security risk and are most vulnerable to deteriorating conditions in the camps.“The problem is that health and security conditions are worsening by the day in the Syrian camps, and the children are growing older,” says Dyah Kartika, IPAC analyst. “They need access to schools, a nurturing environment, and medical attention. If the government waits too long, the children will be further exposed to ISIS ideology.” The new report examines a 2019 list of Indonesians in camps and prisons run by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Indonesian government has been trying to verify their citizenship, but with pseudonyms, misspellings and bad transliterations, it is a daunting task. At the time the data was collected, between March and June 2019, there were 555 Indonesians in SDF camps and prisons, including 367 children. Among the children, approximately 277 were under the age of ten and 34 were unaccompanied. In June 2021, there are fewer than ten children who are both unaccompanied and under the age of ten that could be prioritized for return. Bringing back children of ISIS families is no easy task. The report analyses the main challenges faced by the Indonesian government. These include definitional issues, bureaucratic competition, the difficulty of verifying nationality, evaluating the toll of exposure to conflict, assessing security risk, and finding relatives or others willing to provide care once the children are returned. In addition, COVID has meant stringent restrictions on travel, placing further obstacles in the way of repatriation. There are several models for rehabilitation of children exposed to violent extremism in Indonesia that could be modified to accommodate the needs of children repatriated from abroad. The report examines these models and argues that the government does not need to have every detail of rehabilitation programs in place before it starts extricating children from ISIS influence. It can start by bringing back the most vulnerable children and then modify programs as needed.

“It’s important that the government see these children as victims” says Dyah. “They deserve a chance to be children again.”

How ASEAN Falls into China’s Playbook on the South China Sea