PRIME MINISTER PRAYUT IS NO PRESIDENT XI

THAILAND

By Thitinan Pongsudhirak*

Bangkok Post-Mar 16

     That the Chinese Communist Party-controlled legislature has removed the term limits of the country’s president and vice president has already sent shockwaves worldwide. It means that President Xi Jinping can continue to be China’s head of state into a third term beyond 2023. Even though China’s presidency is less powerful than the Chinese Communist Party’s General Secretary and head of the Central Military Commission, the abolition of presidential term limits sends unmistakable signals that President Xi intends to hold complete and absolute power. He is now seen as more powerful than any contemporary Chinese leader, unrivalled since the time of founding father Mao Zedong.

President Xi’s power consolidation and political longevity is intensely debated. Many see it as runaway power that will pose more risks for the Chinese system, as Mr Xi becomes more unchecked, isolated and susceptible to abuses among his associates and loyalists. Others view Mr Xi’s omnipotent and omnipresent power as necessary to keep political rivals at bay in order to maintain and reinforce the course of political and economic reforms his administration has so far instituted. That debate will continue but the Xi example is likely to encourage and embolden leaders elsewhere to view China as a model of having the cake of economic dynamism while being able to eat it as well with centralized political authority.

It would not be surprising if Thailand’s military government under Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha has been following China’s moves and Mr Xi’s consolidation and centralisation of power with a keen interest. Prime Minister Prayut has already been fond of mentioning Mr Xi’s government doctrine and political thought.

But make no mistake. Thailand is not China, and Gen Prayut is no Mr Xi, for at least three related reasons.

First, unlike Thailand’s military regime which seized power to rule in May 2014, the Chinese government has popular legitimacy. China is unlike Western countries where democracy is broad-based, dispersed and decentralized. China’s system is famously known as “democratic centralism”, underpinned by a Politburo, Central Committee and National People’s Congress. Nobodies can be somebodies. They can rise to power and prominence but they have to join the Chinese Communist Party and do so from within. It is a democratic system under one party, not a multiparty democracy.

Unsurprisingly, the Chinese political system does not sit well with the West or with Asian multiparty democracies like Japan and India. China is seen as authoritarian, lacking a free press and basic civil liberties. Independent and organic civil society to check and counter state power is about non-existent in China. The state governs and leads, and the CCP rules. With Mr Xi’s elevation as head of all three most powerful bodies (the CCP, the military and the presidency), many will think of him as neo-emperor of 21st-century China but, in fact, it is the CCP that is final arbiter with ultimate authority.

While the Prayut government might like to behave top-down with authoritarian control like China, it does not have popular legitimacy. During the first half of its nearly four-year rule, it could argue to have some legitimacy ahead of the royal transition. But now anti-military sentiments are on the rise, clamoring for a change of government through an election. So on the grounds of legitimacy, Thailand under Gen Prayut is not China under Mr Xi.

Second, Mr Xi has been serious and genuine about battling corruption, which is related to political legitimacy. Few people know the name of Mr Xi’s only child and daughter, whereas his wife Peng Liyuan does not act in ways that become his political liability. Googling the name of Mr Xi’s daughter, Xi Mingze, yields scarce information. She completed a Harvard degree and did some volunteer work but not much else is public about her. Peng Liyuan’s published profile is more extensive, based on the merit of her singing prowess. Her background contains some controversies, such as her role in the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989, when she sang for government troops who were facing students. But overall, there’s no hint of graft and abuses that have hounded first ladies elsewhere.

Gen Prayut does not have a first-lady problem but he has fraternal challenges. His own brother, Gen Preecha Chan-o-cha, is seen as having gained personally from the coup. For example, he has drawn a salary as a member of the coup-appointed National Legislative Assembly, in addition to what he was paid as a four-star general. Gen Preecha’s son was also embroiled in conflicts of interest, using military resources for personal gain.

And then there is Gen Prawit Wongsuwon, the unelected prime minister’s “big brother” from his military service, who has been embroiled in a scandal over two dozen luxury watches whose ownership he has not been able to explain convincingly.

The more power he has, the more President Xi has been careful and cautious on perceptions of graft, nepotism and cronyism. Mr Xi is typically dressed in a modest, straightforward fashion, without expensive watches and diamond rings. Mr Xi’s regimen and style appear austere. Gen Prayut is not seen as extravagant but neither is he perceived as humble. His fellow military comrades, on the other hand, have evidently not been modest and austere.

Finally, the Chinese government under Mr Xi performs and maintains growth for its people. China’s new planned growth trajectory of 6.5% with 3% inflation can achieve its aims of being a developed country. China’s economic model is market-consistent but state-driven.

However, the Thai economy under Gen Prayut’s watch is mixed. Economic expansion has hovered in the 3% range. It is not disastrous but nor is it all that dynamic. The state tries to plot its way through schemes such as “Thailand 4.0” and the “Eastern Economic Corridor” but the results are limited.

Thailand’s economic performance under Mr Prayut is subpar, underperforming and underachieving.

China has impressed so far with its economic expansion and political stability, even at the expense of basic freedoms and liberal values. China’s ways may not prove sustainable but many governments and leaders in Southeast Asia and elsewhere will want to emulate China’s model of having its cake and eating it, too. But let’s have no illusions — Thailand does not fit the China model.

*Thitinan Pongsudhirak teaches at the Faculty of Political Science and directs the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University.

(First published in Bangkok Post – https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1429166/prime-minister-prayut-is-no-president-xi)