MYANMAR: ‘Made in China’: Inside the Myanmar Junta’s Intensifying Drone Offensive

Posted by Asia Views | Mar 4, 2025 | 0 |

Irrawaddy-Mar 3

Since late 2014, Myanmar’s military regime has deployed large numbers of drones in key front-line battlefields such as Kachin State’s Bhamo, Shan State’s Taunghkam, and the Asia Highway between Karen State’s Myawaddy and Kawkareik, inflicting heavy casualties on resistance forces and civilians. Recently, the regime has used drones to attack areas controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), including its stronghold of Laiza. Further south, drone units in the junta’s garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin have been targeting the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in Taunghkam, about two hours away.

KIA spokesperson Colonel Naw Bu told The Irrawaddy that the regime is using various types of advanced drones in the battle for Bhamo. The regime only began deploying drones extensively after losing almost all of northern Shan State, including a regional command, to the drone-aided Operation 1027 offensive of the Brotherhood Alliance in 2023. Junta drone units are now attached to almost all strategic hill-top bases and mobile columns, targeting both military and civilian targets. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the Myanmar military’s increasingly sophisticated drone assault now features forward-looking infrared (FLIR) cameras for night battles in Bhamo.

While resistance leaders say the regime is using both Chinese and Russian drones, information obtained by The Irrawaddy indicates that most drones deployed by the regime are Chinese-made VTOL (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) models. The regime is also increasingly using China-made agricultural drones for reconnaissance and bombing missions. Support from China also extends to training. Since the days of the previous State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regime, Beijing has provided training in arms manufacturing to Myanmar military engineers and senior non-commissioned officers after they graduated from technical schools. It also trains graduates of the Defense Services Technological Academy (DSTA) at a military academy in Kunming, Yunnan Province. The regime purchases much of its big-ticket air weaponry from China, including FTC-2000G fighter jets shipped in 2022 and the Y-12 transport aircraft currently used for bombing missions. Regime soldiers began attending drone training courses in Tianjin in early 2024, according to resistance sources. Read more at: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/made-in-china-inside-the-myanmar-juntas-intensifying-drone-offensive.html

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EXTRICATING NDONESIAN CHILDREN FROM ISIS INFLUENCE ABROAD

Indonesia urgently needs to revisit the possibility of repatriating the neediest of its young citizens stranded abroad, whose families had earlier joined ISIS. Most of these children are in camps in northern Syria but there are also small numbers in the Philippines, Afghanistan and Iraq. “Extricating Indonesian Children from ISIS Influence Abroad”, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) argues that the government could begin by bringing back small groups of unaccompanied children under ten years of age, who pose minimal security risk and are most vulnerable to deteriorating conditions in the camps.“The problem is that health and security conditions are worsening by the day in the Syrian camps, and the children are growing older,” says Dyah Kartika, IPAC analyst. “They need access to schools, a nurturing environment, and medical attention. If the government waits too long, the children will be further exposed to ISIS ideology.” The new report examines a 2019 list of Indonesians in camps and prisons run by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Indonesian government has been trying to verify their citizenship, but with pseudonyms, misspellings and bad transliterations, it is a daunting task. At the time the data was collected, between March and June 2019, there were 555 Indonesians in SDF camps and prisons, including 367 children. Among the children, approximately 277 were under the age of ten and 34 were unaccompanied. In June 2021, there are fewer than ten children who are both unaccompanied and under the age of ten that could be prioritized for return. Bringing back children of ISIS families is no easy task. The report analyses the main challenges faced by the Indonesian government. These include definitional issues, bureaucratic competition, the difficulty of verifying nationality, evaluating the toll of exposure to conflict, assessing security risk, and finding relatives or others willing to provide care once the children are returned. In addition, COVID has meant stringent restrictions on travel, placing further obstacles in the way of repatriation. There are several models for rehabilitation of children exposed to violent extremism in Indonesia that could be modified to accommodate the needs of children repatriated from abroad. The report examines these models and argues that the government does not need to have every detail of rehabilitation programs in place before it starts extricating children from ISIS influence. It can start by bringing back the most vulnerable children and then modify programs as needed.

“It’s important that the government see these children as victims” says Dyah. “They deserve a chance to be children again.”

MYANMAR: ‘Made in China’: Inside the Myanmar Junta’s Intensifying Drone Offensive

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