JOKOWI VS JOKOWI

Posted by AsiaViews | Mar 11, 2018 | 0 |

INDONESIA

The Jakarta Post-Mar 6

Joko Widodo should have more self-confidence as he prepares to run for a second presidential term. Several polls have indicated that he has a very good chance of reelection. The electability of the former governor of Jakarta is not yet beyond doubt because his rating is still below 50 percent; but he is in a much stronger position than Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was one year before he won his second term.

One year before the presidential election, to be held in April 2019, at the same time as the voting for members of the legislative bodies, Jokowi is a long way ahead of his nearest rival, Prabowo Subianto. Given that the vote shares of the parties in the 2014 elections will be used to determine who can run for the presidency, there is only a very small chance that a strong alternative will emerge. Moreover, if the votes of all the undecided voters were shared between the two men, Jokowi would likely come out on top.

Public satisfaction with the performance of President Jokowi and Vice President Jusuf Kallas administration is also fairly high at around 70 percent. The public clearly judges the government’s infrastructure projects a success. Despite the problems including unclear funding and a series of workplace accidents the construction of these public facilities during the Jokowi era has indeed shown progress.

On top of that, Jokowi now controls a majority of the political power in the House of Representatives (DPR). After more than three-and-a-half years in office, he has managed to consolidate the parties, including those that did not support him in 2014, such as the Golkar Party and the National Mandate Party (PAN). Jokowi is now more than just an Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) party hack, he is the controlling shareholder of some of the main parties supporting him. For next years election, at least five parties have once again adopted him as their presidential candidate the PDI-P, Golkar Party, National Democrat (NasDem) Party, United Development Party (PPP) and the Hanura Party. He holds a very strong bargaining position going into next years presidential election, including in picking his running mate.

Unless something extraordinary and out of his control happens to say, a major economic crisis or being involved in corruption he will probably win. Attempts to erode his support by spreading accusations, for instance connecting him with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), is almost certainly doomed to failure. According to a poll carried out by Poltracking Indonesia, the successful candidate in the 2019 elections will be a man of the people, who is honest and has integrity, and is authoritative characteristics generally associated with Jokowi.

Some believe that the strong support for Jokowi could slip away as a result of racist campaigning of the type that scuppered Basuki Tjahaja Purnama in last years gubernatorial vote in Jakarta. But there is not much basis for this view because Jokowi is not burdened by a ¡®triple minority status the term often used by Basuki about himself: adherent of a minority religion, hailing from an ethnic minority, and enjoying no party-political support. Meanwhile, neither does Jokowi communicate like Basuki, who tended to shoot his mouth off and was highly prone to blunders.

Thus Jokowi has the unique advantage of being free to choose his running mate. He can choose the best person for the job, somebody who has a proven track record and the capacity to help him tackle problems over the next five years. He could reflect on the success of Yudhoyono when strengthening his electability in 2009 by choosing Bank Indonesia governor Boediono as his running mate, in order to beat his rivals, party leaders Megawati Sukarnoputri-Prabowo and Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto.

Jokowi should not fall into the trap of sectarian concern. Given his clear 2014 defeats in three provinces West Sumatra, West Java and West Nusa TenggaraJokowi is now reportedly trying to secure victories there. The main reason for his losses was the view that he did not represent Muslim voters in those three provinces. In selecting his 2019 running mate, Jokowi is reportedly considering a candidate who will be able to pump up his share of the Muslim vote. This kind of identity politics will be a step backward for democracy.

Of course, Jokowi is entitled to choose a running mate who will have the potential to run in the 2024 presidential election, but this desire should be based on the guarantee of continuing development, not on political security after his term ends.

In recent days, we have seen strenuous efforts by potential running mates to win Jokowi’s heart. At the same time, these days we are also seeing Jokowi battling with himself.

(first published in Tempo – https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2018/03/06/314916364/Jokowi-versus-Jokowi)

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EXTRICATING NDONESIAN CHILDREN FROM ISIS INFLUENCE ABROAD

Indonesia urgently needs to revisit the possibility of repatriating the neediest of its young citizens stranded abroad, whose families had earlier joined ISIS. Most of these children are in camps in northern Syria but there are also small numbers in the Philippines, Afghanistan and Iraq. “Extricating Indonesian Children from ISIS Influence Abroad”, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) argues that the government could begin by bringing back small groups of unaccompanied children under ten years of age, who pose minimal security risk and are most vulnerable to deteriorating conditions in the camps.“The problem is that health and security conditions are worsening by the day in the Syrian camps, and the children are growing older,” says Dyah Kartika, IPAC analyst. “They need access to schools, a nurturing environment, and medical attention. If the government waits too long, the children will be further exposed to ISIS ideology.” The new report examines a 2019 list of Indonesians in camps and prisons run by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Indonesian government has been trying to verify their citizenship, but with pseudonyms, misspellings and bad transliterations, it is a daunting task. At the time the data was collected, between March and June 2019, there were 555 Indonesians in SDF camps and prisons, including 367 children. Among the children, approximately 277 were under the age of ten and 34 were unaccompanied. In June 2021, there are fewer than ten children who are both unaccompanied and under the age of ten that could be prioritized for return. Bringing back children of ISIS families is no easy task. The report analyses the main challenges faced by the Indonesian government. These include definitional issues, bureaucratic competition, the difficulty of verifying nationality, evaluating the toll of exposure to conflict, assessing security risk, and finding relatives or others willing to provide care once the children are returned. In addition, COVID has meant stringent restrictions on travel, placing further obstacles in the way of repatriation. There are several models for rehabilitation of children exposed to violent extremism in Indonesia that could be modified to accommodate the needs of children repatriated from abroad. The report examines these models and argues that the government does not need to have every detail of rehabilitation programs in place before it starts extricating children from ISIS influence. It can start by bringing back the most vulnerable children and then modify programs as needed.

“It’s important that the government see these children as victims” says Dyah. “They deserve a chance to be children again.”

JOKOWI VS JOKOWI