By Johannes Nugroho*
Today Online
16 Jan 2018
In October last year, the chief of Indonesia’s top graft-busting agency the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Saut Situmorang said that the country’s Corruption Perception Index lagged behind Malaysia’s and blamed the country’s “top-down hierarchical” system which tends to breed corruption. While Indonesia’s venal culture is a major stumbling block, its efforts to eradicate graft face a more immediate threat in the increasing politicization of the anti-corruption movement.
Simply put, Indonesia’s anti-corruption drive is in danger of turning into a farce as government agencies, politicians and even regional leaders fight for control of investigation and prosecution.
For Indonesia’s law enforcement agencies, control means power.
Corruption charges are after all, one of the few things that could end careers in politics or public service. The recent political tumble of Setya Novanto is a good example. Novanto, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, was taken into custody last November for suspicion of corrupt dealings in the national electronic identity card tender (e-KTP).
The man Donald Trump once described as “one of the most powerful men in Indonesia” was subsequently relieved of his parliamentary speakership and chairmanship of the Golkar Party, Indonesia’s second largest political party.
His downfall effectively demonstrates the power a graft-busting institution like KPK could wield in Indonesian politics.
Novanto’s exit from Golkar – currently in the coalition which supports the incumbent President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo – has indirectly benefitted the president as it paved way for Mr Widodo’s Minister of Industry Airlangga Hartarto to become the party’s chairman.
KPK’s largely dominant role in tackling corruption since its inception in 2002 has long been the source of envy by the other law-enforcement agencies, particularly the Indonesian Police (Polri) and the Atttorney General Office, both of which have now sought to challenge the status quo.
Polri Chief General Tito Karnavian said late last year in a parliamentary hearing that the police would form its own Anti-Corruption Detachment (Densus Anti Korupsi), an agency which would investigate and prosecute corruption cases in cooperation with the Attorney General Office.
Clearly angling for parliamentary support for his plan, and additional budget, Gen Karnavian, however, failed to elaborate on how to prevent overlapping authorities between KPK and his proposed new detachment.
Since then, the Indonesian Police has lost no time in trying to prove that it is as capable of handling corruption cases as KPK.
Polri’s Criminal Division Chief, Commissioner General Ari Dono Sukmanto, recently announced that the police had uncovered the “biggest corruption case in the history” of the republic; namely irregularities in the sale of gas condensate between PT Trans Pacific Petrochemical Indotama and the Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas Business Activities.
Gen Sukmanto alleged that the condensate case had incurred around US$2.8 billion (S$3.7) in losses for the state.
Polri has also diligently taken up other cases, such as the alleged price mark-ups in the purchase of 65 patrol boats within the Ministry of Transportation, the construction of a mini power plant within the Directorate of Oil and Gas under the Ministry of Energy and alleged fund embezzlements in two regional banks.
Interestingly, the police have largely concentrated its anti-graft offensive against officials within the executive branch of government, preferring to go easy on their legislative counterparts.
While the pattern may just be coincidental, there is no denying that Polri’s hope of establishing its anti-graft detachment makes it partially beholden to parliament, which has the power to approve additional budget for it.
The House of Representatives (DPR) also makes a natural ally for Polri in its rivalry against KPK.
DPR had been embroiled in a tug-of-war with KPK over the multiple arrests of MPs charged with corruption. So far KPK has detained 119 MPs, both national and regional, for graft-related offences.
Deputy Speaker of DPR Fahri Hamzah last year called for the disbandment of KPK, lambasting it as a “source of political disturbance”.
DPR then announced it was drafting “revisions” to replace the original 2002 KPK Bill with clauses to curtail the agency’s powers and prerogatives.
The latest challenge to KPK’s legitimacy came from unexpected quarters: the provincial government of Jakarta, now headed by Governor Anies Baswedan and his deputy Sandiaga Uno.
Baffling many, Mr Baswedan recently inaugurated a new anti-graft agency under his administration, provocatively with the same acronym (KPK), though standing for Komite Pencegahan Korupsi (Corruption Prevention Committee).
He went on to reassure the public that his KPK would not interfere with the duties and authority of its national counterpart since it would focus on the prevention of corruption within his administration.
Yet, soon after, his deputy asked the new agency to identify possible graft in the purchase of two tracts of land by the previous administration.
His decision to set up his own anti-graft body may be interpreted as a vote of no-confidence in the impartiality of the national KPK, spurred on by the fear within his camp that KPK was after the governor for past misdeeds.
Mr Baswedan had started his political career as Minister of Education under President Widodo in 2014 but was replaced in a 2016 reshuffle.
As minister, he was blamed for a major blunder in 2016 when his ministry had miscalculated its yearly budget by almost US$1.8 billion.
So when a KPK Commissioner Agus Rahardjo told the press March last year that his agency was looking into another corruption scandal which was “bigger” than Setya Novanto’s e-ktp case, speculation was rife that KPK was now targeting Mr Baswedan.
Deservedly or not, opposition politicians see KPK as a powerful political tool of the government and are clearly trying to undercut it.
Hence, Indonesia’s anti-corruption drive has become, at best, a political commodity to generate public support or at worst, a political weapon.
The ongoing fight to dominate and manipulate public opinion of anti-corruption efforts in Indonesia has complicated an already uphill struggle against endemic venality in the country.
If allowed to fester, Chief Situmorang may have to concede that catching up with Malaysia’s corruption index will truly be mission impossible.
*Johannes Nugroho is a writer from Surabaya.
(Accessible at: http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/when-fighting-graft-becomes-politicised-indonesia)
