Myanmar Times-Thompson Chau-Feb 19
To view the vast array of actors and interests behind Chinese foreign policies and humanitarian actions in Myanmar as one single “China Inc.” is extremely simplistic, experts told The Myanmar Times. China has long emphasised its engagement with Myanmar owing to Beijing’s “peripheral diplomacy” since the 1990s, predating the Belt and Road Initiative which has caught plenty of attention these days. Examples include China assisting disaster-affected people in Myanmar in 2014, offering mediation efforts to Myanmar’s peace process and calling on Chinese businesses to be more community-minded in the country.
These diplomatic efforts and humanitarian intervention go far beyond the aspiration of the Belt and Road Initiative or considerations of an expanding national interest, and involve multiple actors and processes in Myanmar which are less coordinated and more contingent than traditionally assumed.
Miwa Hirono, associate professor at the College of International Relations at Ritsumeikan University, recently published her report “Exploring the links between Chinese foreign policy and humanitarian action” as part of the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute in London.
China’s emergence as a global player and its increasingly active humanitarian intervention often lead to accusations that its aid and action will be used as a disguise or a means to expand its power.
Yet, in an interview with The Myanmar Times, Dr Hirono argued that dealing with China as one single unit is “extremely simplistic”. “The accusations are simplistic because, as I explained in my paper, China’s humanitarian actions involve multiple actors, multiple process and multiple interests. All are multiple,” she said. Often, there is an impression that China has a “unified holistic approach” to Myanmar, or an individual country.
“This image — that China as China Inc. is trying to expand its interest — is not necessarily true. When dealing with one issue, let’s say a natural disaster, there are many actors working in that particular area, involving the commerce ministry, the foreign ministry, Chinese NGOs and businesses. These actors do not necessarily coordinate their activities and each agency has its own remit,” she said.
Furthermore, Beijing does not have a “unified policy” to decide when, where and how to allocate its humanitarian assistance to different countries. The central government’s ministry of commerce takes charge of China’s overseas aid but decisions are made on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis.
In Myanmar, China sometimes extends humanitarian aid to Kachin refugees, but sometimes it pushes them out of the border. Beijing’s response depends on domestic pressure as well as security and other concerns. But this reactive, rather than proactive, approach is no longer the only action: equally significantly, Beijing has more recently engaged in diplomatic mediation that addresses the root causes of humanitarian issues in Myanmar. Hence, the humanitarian approach has become multifaceted.
Likewise, Dr Chris Ogden, associate professor in Asian Security, School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, told The Myanmar Times that any state engaging in humanitarian intervention does so, to some degree, to enhance its international image in a self-interested manner.
“For China, having a secure and stable periphery is a key part of its foreign policy that helps it protect its economic basis in order to fulfil its general development and modernisation goals, and as such Myanmar falls within this remit,” he explained.
China’s humanitarian actions are merely part of “a menu of economic, military and diplomatic ties that Beijing has with Myanmar” and, as a consequence, such accusations do appear to be “overly simplistic and to a certain measure, inaccurate presumptions”, the expert continued.
“PERIPHERAL DIPLOMACY”
China’s humanitarian actions in Myanmar are part of its Peripheral Diplomacy. This is not new — even during the Mao period, until 1976, the country was mindful of its relations with its neighbours. In the early 1990s, Peripheral Diplomacy was directed towards advancing China’s program of modernisation, and to that end resolving border disputes and facilitating regional cooperation with Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries.
Nowadays, President Xi Jinping prioritises the importance of Peripheral Diplomacy as the second tier of China’s overall diplomatic arrangements: “Great powers as the keys; periphery takes the first priority; developing countries as bases; and multilateral [institutions] as an important stage.”
Dr Hirono said that the tenets of Peripheral Diplomacy — “mulin, anlin, fulin” (be friendly, make them feel secure and help their economies prosper) — lead and shape Beijing’s engagement with Myanmar.
“China needs to take care of its border regions, mainly for security concerns, and Myanmar is one of the most important countries in the border regions,” she went on. Myanmar’s importance to Beijing’s national interest is a significant factor but not the only driver behind China’s humanitarian policies. China’s international image as a responsible great power, for example, is also an important driver.
DIPLOMATIC MEDIATION
Apart from aid, China has also engaged in diplomacy and mediation to prevent or end conflict in Myanmar since 2015, seeking to address the root causes of humanitarian issues. Dr Hirono said that China’s mediation efforts in Myanmar is “extremely welcoming”.
“Traditional mediators in the West tend to point out a particular actor, whether it is the local government and those in the opposite camp, and condemn it for humanitarian atrocities. China has been very hesitant to condemn the Myanmar government over the Rohingya crisis but instead has offered a brokering role. The fact that the China does not condemn the host government as well as the actors in opposition helps bringing these conflicting parties to the negotiation table,” she said. Similar approach was undertaken by Japan but Tokyo’s mediation and aid involvement internationally has a much longer history than Beijing.
“For China, having a secure and stable periphery is a key part of its foreign policy that helps it protect its economic basis in order to fulfil its general development and modernisation goals, and as such Myanmar falls within this remit,” he explained.
China’s humanitarian actions are merely part of “a menu of economic, military and diplomatic ties that Beijing has with Myanmar” and, as a consequence, such accusations do appear to be “overly simplistic and to a certain measure, inaccurate presumptions”, the expert continued.
Beijing’s national interest is a significant factor but not the only driver behind China’s humanitarian policies. China’s international image as a responsible great power, for example, is also an important driver.
There are, however, significant limits to what Chinese mediation can offer, and the Chinese government has yet to engineer any meaningful breakthroughs in these conflicts, the academic argued.
“So far, China has not had a tangible effect in drawing ceasefire. But it has managed to bring different conflicting parties at the negotiating table. And for that, China’s mediation efforts should be welcomed and encouraged even further.”
But Dr Ogden said that China’s endeavour to inculcate and encourage the peace process are naturally dependent upon Myanmar’s internal politics coupled with external factors, and are thus “not the sole criterion for success or failure”.
“Ultimately the final arbiter will be what political elites within Myanmar decide to do, and as such Chinese efforts in a Chinese way — via a non-aggressive and non-coercive style — are prisoner to these domestic elements,” he stated.
CHINESE NGOs
Meanwhile, Chinese NGOs are increasingly involved in expanding overseas operations, such as assisting disaster-affected people in Myanmar in 2014.
Beijing and its Yangon embassy also encouraged companies to be more community-minded in response to floods in Myanmar in 2015. This represents a deviation from the conventional policy, partly as a result of the Myitsone dam incident which sparked “community-mindedness” among Chinese companies operating in the country.
The associate professor noted that, before 2010, there was not much instruction from the Chinese embassy to Chinese companies to pay more attention to community relations. Chinese firms tend to be more autonomous in decision making than people imagined with profit as the primary concerns, as with many non-Chinese businesses.
I n recent year, some companies from China realised that it contributes to their long-term growth if community relations are managed well and conflict is prevented, but “only a small minority of companies” among those from China have started to realise that.
Furthermore, China is a strong proponent of the role of host governments in the provision of aid, and of the importance of development assistance in reducing poverty and humanitarian need. China’s engagement with Myanmar relies much more on government-to-government channels than multilateral institutions.
“The UK, Japan and other OECD countries tend to pay much more to multilateral institutions than China does, which then deliver humanitarian assistance to NGOs and host governments. For China, 85pc of its international humanitarian aid is dispensed through government to government channels, not to multilateral organisations,” Dr Hirono remarked, adding that this more ad hoc provision risks missing opportunities to assist in some humanitarian crises.
Dr Ogden also said that Beijing does not presuppose reform conditions when it gives aid, as part of an intended practice of benevolence.
“The Chinese stance is less ideologically-centred and less coercive than many external countries for whom giving aid requires the recipient country to carry out accompanying concessions in terms of political or bureaucratic reform, which is often true for the aid policies of both the UK and the US,” he observed.