By Muh Taufiqurrohman, Muhammad Ali Usman and Ardi Putra*

Today

Nov 6, 2017

In Indonesia, imprisonment has not stopped terrorist inmates associated with the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group from recruiting new members, directing terrorist activities and building militant networks outside the prison.

To prevent these activities, the Indonesian government through the National CounterTerrorism Agency (BNPT), the Directorate General of Correction (Dirjen LAPAS) and police anti-terror unit, Detachment 88 (Indonesia’s premier counter-terrorism agency), have taken various counter measures but these can be improved upon to achieve better results.

What are the factors that account for terrorist inmates’ ability to carry out various illegal activities within their prisons, and what can be done about this?

Based on our empirical observations of the prisons on Nusa Kambangan Island in Central Java where high-risk terrorists are detained, we argue that the lack of qualified prison staff and funds as well as prison mismanagement have allowed terrorist inmates to continue their subversive activities from the prisons.

PRO-IS INMATES

As of July 2017, there are 45 terrorist inmates incarcerated in Nusa Kambangan prisons. Fourteen of them are placed in Pasir Putih Prison, the maximum-security prison on the island. The other 15 are housed in Batu prison, and the rest are spread in Besi Prison (six inmates), Kembang Kuning Prison (six inmates) and Permisan Prison (four inmates).

Of these 45 inmates, at least 39 are pro-IS inmates. Among the pro-IS inmates, the high-profile militants include Aman Abdurrahman and Iwan Darmawan alias Rois who have directed pro-IS network and terrorist activities from their prison cells. When Aman Abdurrahman and Rois were detained in Kembang Kuning Prison in 2015, they directed the establishment of the militant group Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah Islamiyah (JAKI), which police and media now call Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD).

Aman also directed Saiful Muhtorir alias Abu Ghar to establish a pro-IS group in the Moluccas. Rois not only funded JAKI’s national meeting in Malang (East Java) in November 2015, he also funded its military trainings in Malang and Cipanas (West Java) in December 2015.

In addition to that, he coordinated his men, Abu Ghar and Abu Asbal, to obtain weapons from Bandung gunsmiths for the January 2016 Jakarta attack. (It turned out that the gunsmiths did not manufacture the weapons they wanted.)

He also directed Suryadi Masud to smuggle weapons from the Philippines into Indonesia, and masterminded and funded the January 2016 Jakarta attack.

On February 9 2016, the Dirjen LAPAS transferred Aman and Rois to Pasir Putih Prison and placed them in solitary cells, after Detachment 88 discovered their involvement in the attack. However, both continued to direct their network outside the prison in two ways.

The first is through couriers and subordinates, namely Musolah and Dzulkifli Lubis. Musolah is a terrorist inmate involved in the 2011 Cirebon bombing, and Lubis is a terrorist inmate who sold weapons to Musolah.

Through Musolah and Lubis, both Aman and Rois advise their followers outside the prison, and receive messages from their followers. Aman and Rois write their messages on pieces of paper and send them to Musolah and Lubis by couriers. One of these couriers is a trusted senior non-terrorist inmate.

After receiving the messages, Musolah and Lubis would contact the families and followers of Aman and Rois outside the prison through phone calls or Telegram to deliver the messages. Their families and followers then respond to their messages using the same methods.

Musolah and Lubis then write down their messages on papers that they use to package food for Aman and Rois. The families of Aman and Rois also receive messages from both men when they visit them.

Both inmates write their messages on papers and hide these papers in their folded shirt sleeves. When they meet their visiting families, they secretly give these papers to them; the families in turn smuggle them out of the prison and convey these messages to the followers of Aman and Rois.

Two other notable detainees are Abdullah Sonata and Achmad Widodo alias Abu Hanifah, who unlike Aman and Rois, have focused on recruiting new members in the prison. Usually, their targets are ordinary inmates with criminal backgrounds in search of redemption to atone for their past crimes.

Two cases in point are Herman and Muhammad Tata. Herman was recruited when he was imprisoned in Batu Prison for a drug-related offence. Both Herman and Tata were recruited in 2015. Tata was approached by Abdullah Sonata in common areas of Batu Prison such as visitor rooms and mosque.

In an effort to restrict Abdullah Sonata’s recruitment activities, Dirjen LAPAS transferred him from Batu Prison to Pasir Putih Prison on March 1. This was based on the recommendation from Detachment 88 and a Batu Prison warden.

On the same day, another terrorist inmate, Muhammad Ichwan alias Abu Umar, was also transferred to Pasir Putih Prison for his suspected recruitment activities in Batu Prison.

Just three months after his transfer, Abdullah Sonata managed to recruit Muhammad Tata to be his student and subordinate. One of Tata’s jobs is to record sermons given by Aman Abdurrahman and help distribute the recording to pro-IS extremists outside the prison through Telegram groups.

What’s Behind Radicalization in Prison?

There are multiple factors that account for radicalization in Nusa Kambangan prisons such as the lack of trained prison staff, insufficient operational funds and misplacement of terrorist inmates.

Furthermore, the prisons on the island are understaffed and overworked, with only one prison guard watching over 60 inmates comprising both terrorists and criminals. Consequently, the prison authorities are unable to monitor the activities of every terrorist inmate efficiently.

Additionally, the majority of prison staffers do not have adequate knowledge of extremism and terrorism. As such, they have no knowledge of how to counter IS propaganda in their prisons. Fear of losing their lives adds to their problems.

They are bullied and threatened on a daily basis by IS inmates who call them apostates and worthy to be killed.

The number of Detachment 88 officers working in the prisons is also small. There are only two officers responsible for managing visits of terrorist inmates, recruiting informants from among the inmates and de-radicalizing them.

Yet, they are required to help other officers to conduct surveillance on terrorists operating around the island. For these reasons, they do not have enough time to watch the inmates in each prison daily.

Shortage of funds also hinders Detachment 88’s efforts in recruiting more informants, and limits them in rewarding inmates who are cooperative. This discourages the inmates from giving intelligence tip offs to the officers or participating in the officers’ de-radicalization program.

Each month the officers only receive around US$300. In contrast, they need at least US$2,400 per month to recruit informants and de-radicalize 40 terrorist inmates.

Keeping terrorist and criminal inmates in the same prison cells and lax security measures have facilitated radicalization and hampered de-radicalization of low-ranking terrorist inmates (the “foot-soldiers”).

Non-terrorist inmates, even in the high security Pasir Putih Prison, are able to mingle with terrorist inmates. Recruiters such as Abdullah Sonata and Abu Hanifah have taken advantage of this.

They hold at least weekly religious study groups in which they spread their extremist views to non-terrorist inmates.

“High-ranking” terrorist inmates (they include the ideologues and commanders) stay in the same block as “low-ranking” terrorist inmates.

The “high-ranking” inmates do not cooperate with prison staff and Detachment officers because they do not want to be seen as weak by “low-ranking” inmates. On the other hand, the latter do not want to cooperate with the staff and officers because they fear punishment from their senior inmates.

Urgent Reforms Needed

The less than satisfactory situation in Nusa Kambangan prison complex requires urgent attention.

First, the Indonesian government should build a separate prison facility for terrorist inmates. All hardcore terrorist inmates should be placed in solitary confinement, and only allowed to interact with their visiting families, de-radicalization officers and prison guards.

After they have been de-radicalized, they should be moved to shared cells ahead of their release. BNPT has a prison in Sentul, Bogor that suits this purpose. The Dirjen LAPAS and BNPT need to build such a prison on Nusa Kambangan or outside Java.

Papua is a good location for the prison. Its long distance from Jakarta will limit the inmates‟ access to their followers. Dirjen LAPAS however is planning to place all terrorist inmates in Nusa Kambangan Pasir Putih Prison.

Secondly, the government should employ qualified religious counsellors in each prison permanently. Working with former jihadists, these counsellors will discuss religious topics with the inmates to counter extremist teachings at least on a weekly basis.

The discussions should be on a one-on-one basis, and not held in a big group to avoid peer pressure and grandstanding among the inmates.

Finally, Dirjen LAPAS need to recruit more prison guards to work in Nusa Kambangan prisons. These guards should be trained in counter-terrorism and counter-extremism so that they know how to handle terrorist inmates.

Police also need to place more Detachment 88 officers, both for improving their intelligence gathering and de-radicalization efforts. More funds should also be earmarked to enable these officers to recruit more informants and step up their de-radicalization efforts.

The majority of the terrorist inmates in Nusa Kambangan prison support IS. Their incarceration does not stop them from conducting terrorist-related activities.

It is imperative for the Indonesian government to solve the problem of prison radicalization by placing terrorist inmates in a special prison or solitary confinements, employing full-time religious counsellors, recruiting more qualified prison guards and more Detachment 88 officers, and increasing the prison’s operational budget.

*Muh Taufiqurrohman is a senior researcher at the Centre for Radicalism and De-radicalization Studies based in Central Java. Muhammad Ali Usman is a researcher at the Institute of Southeast Asian Islam – UIN Sunan Kalijaga (Indonesia).

*Ardi Putra Prasetya is a postgraduate student at Criminology Department, University of Indonesia. This is adapted from a longer piece in S Rajaratnam School of International Studies’ Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis.

(http://www.todayonline.com/world/why-terrorism-breeds-indonesian-prisons)