India’s Southeast Asia Pivot, Third Time’s a Charm?

Posted by AsiaViews | Jan 29, 2018 | 0 |

Celebrating the silver jubilee of ASEAN-India relations, Prime Minister Narendra Modi penned an op-ed stating that the relations between India and the regional grouping is “free from contests and claims”, and that both share a common vision for the future that is built on “belief in sovereign equality of all nations irrespective of size”.

The opinion piece, published by 27 newspapers as 10 ASEAN leaders descended for a summit in Delhi on Friday, is a clear criticism of China’s growing hegemony and assertiveness in Southeast Asia as well as a statement of conviction to India’s desire to become a balancing power amid the perception of US decline and withdrawal under Donald Trump.

India’s pivot to Southeast Asia is, of course, not new. It began with India’s Look East Policy that lasted from 1991 until 2002. The primary push was to bring economic relations with Southeast Asia’s so-called “rising tigers” to new heights. This did not go well as major economies in the region fell into a deep recession following the 1997-1998 monetary crises.

The second phase of the Look East Policy had India diverting its attention elsewhere. Then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh broadened the scope of the policy by including China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The outcome was a mixed bag as it was eclipsed by the rise of BRIC as a formidable economic club of emerging economies, which includes India. By November 2015, Goldman Sachs closed down its BRIC investment fund as the economies suffered from falling global demand and lower commodity prices. In the following year everyone seemed to be convinced that the BRIC bubble had burst.

Enter the third phase. Once again, India is looking to bolstering relations with Southeast Asian nations, this time by offering a new outlook, calling it “Act East Policy”. On top of the usual agenda of strengthening trade and investment, this new approach presents India as a potential security balancer to China amid rising tensions in the South China Sea. India has so far secured defense cooperation with Myanmar, India and Vietnam to jointly patrol the Malacca Straits.

Given the security dynamics in the region, there is definitely a role for India to play. However, it is still questionable that India will live up to its newly-found geostrategic ambitions. A look into India’s recent economic engagements with Southeast Asian countries, particularly those on infrastructure, is not comforting.

There has been lack of progress in the construction of India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway as well as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project, resulting in negative perceptions on India’s capacity to deliver on its commitments. Secondly, the annual value of foreign investment coming from India to ASEAN countries has generally been on a downward trajectory since 2013. Meanwhile, China’s investments to the region endured, totaling at $37 billion from 2012 to 2016 versus India’s $12 billion. Last but not least, trade relations also disappoint. ASEAN’s total trade value reached $58 billion in 2016 with India, down by 21.7 per cent compared to five years before, versus $368 billion with China, an increase of 24.8 per cent.

Of course, a relationship is a two way street, but ASEAN is equally an unreliable partner. A student of history knows that ASEAN countries have never been able to escape the patron-client system, a reality that has persisted since the Cold War era. The only thing that has changed is the face of the masters. More worryingly, as these countries continue to struggle for autonomy, their efforts are currently being undermined by domestic political instabilities, which in the case of Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam have led to the rise of authoritarianism. Opposition leaders have been sacked, journalists gagged and human rights trampled upon. Democracy is slowly being decimated in these countries, bringing them closer to China.

All these factors further highlight the need for a rebalancing power in Southeast Asia. Sadly, India is not up for the task. At least for now.

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EXTRICATING NDONESIAN CHILDREN FROM ISIS INFLUENCE ABROAD

Indonesia urgently needs to revisit the possibility of repatriating the neediest of its young citizens stranded abroad, whose families had earlier joined ISIS. Most of these children are in camps in northern Syria but there are also small numbers in the Philippines, Afghanistan and Iraq. “Extricating Indonesian Children from ISIS Influence Abroad”, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) argues that the government could begin by bringing back small groups of unaccompanied children under ten years of age, who pose minimal security risk and are most vulnerable to deteriorating conditions in the camps.“The problem is that health and security conditions are worsening by the day in the Syrian camps, and the children are growing older,” says Dyah Kartika, IPAC analyst. “They need access to schools, a nurturing environment, and medical attention. If the government waits too long, the children will be further exposed to ISIS ideology.” The new report examines a 2019 list of Indonesians in camps and prisons run by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Indonesian government has been trying to verify their citizenship, but with pseudonyms, misspellings and bad transliterations, it is a daunting task. At the time the data was collected, between March and June 2019, there were 555 Indonesians in SDF camps and prisons, including 367 children. Among the children, approximately 277 were under the age of ten and 34 were unaccompanied. In June 2021, there are fewer than ten children who are both unaccompanied and under the age of ten that could be prioritized for return. Bringing back children of ISIS families is no easy task. The report analyses the main challenges faced by the Indonesian government. These include definitional issues, bureaucratic competition, the difficulty of verifying nationality, evaluating the toll of exposure to conflict, assessing security risk, and finding relatives or others willing to provide care once the children are returned. In addition, COVID has meant stringent restrictions on travel, placing further obstacles in the way of repatriation. There are several models for rehabilitation of children exposed to violent extremism in Indonesia that could be modified to accommodate the needs of children repatriated from abroad. The report examines these models and argues that the government does not need to have every detail of rehabilitation programs in place before it starts extricating children from ISIS influence. It can start by bringing back the most vulnerable children and then modify programs as needed.

“It’s important that the government see these children as victims” says Dyah. “They deserve a chance to be children again.”

India’s Southeast Asia Pivot, Third Time’s a Charm?